Speeches

As prepared for delivery.

Here is one enormous change that is affecting universities: Since the U.S. became a world power, it has never had a rival capable of challenging it militarily, diplomatically, economically, and scientifically—but China is now challenging the U.S. on all fronts. Universities need to adapt to this new reality—and have been adapting. 

Universities must continue to advance knowledge—not just for its own sake, but also to help the U.S. in this global competition. The U.S. still leads China in the conduct of curiosity-driven basic research. We need to increase the resources we devote to such research, as it’s one place from which radically new knowledge and technologies emerge.

In addition, universities also need to conduct—and the federal government needs to fund—more use-inspired basic research. This is not applied research—it is research at the very frontiers of science, yet targeted at overcoming specific problems that stand in the way of innovation. One classic example is the effort at Bell Labs in the 1940s to replace the bulky vacuum tubes used in telephone technology, which led to the invention of the semiconductor transistor and a Nobel Prize in Physics. I am delighted that, thanks partly to the Chips and Science Act, the NSF now has a Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships directorate focused on use-inspired research. Unfortunately, Congress has fallen far short in funding the science part of the Act.

Furthermore, we need to ensure that the U.S. reaps the benefits of homegrown discoveries and inventions.

At MIT, about a decade ago, we became deeply concerned that some of the most groundbreaking inventions emerging from our laboratories did not advance to commercialization because of the lack of long-term, patient capital. In fields as important as clean energy and regenerative medicine, the timeline to commercialization for risky new technologies was simply too long for most private investors. This led MIT to create The Engine in 2016, our own accelerator and venture capital fund for “tough tech,” which today includes 50 innovative companies in its portfolio.

But this is just one investment organization in just one place. We need many more throughout the nation. The CHIPS and Science Act recognizes this by authorizing the NSF to help start similar organizations. The danger of ignoring the limited availability of patient capital is that entire fields may stall out and, worse yet, may end up being developed first in competing nations.

In recent years, many in the country’s political leadership have recognized that the domestic manufacturing of critical technologies is a national and economic security imperative. With semiconductors, lithium-ion batteries, and solar hardware, the U.S. is now trying to recapture manufacturing industries already largely lost to Asia. We should not repeat this history with the transformative technologies currently emerging from American universities. Our focus should be on incentivizing and de-risking private investments in the domestic manufacturing of critical emerging technologies. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this—most outside the NSF’s purview—including tax policies, government procurement contracts, and possibly a new U.S. government corporation to provide some initial capital. In addition, we must carry out advanced manufacturing research and education in our universities to support domestic manufacturing.

American universities are also challenged by the need to carefully balance national security concerns with the many benefits of academic exchanges with China. China is now the world’s other great superpower in science and engineering, and Chinese researchers are the most frequent international co-authors for American researchers in peer-reviewed journals. Putting blanket limitations on such collaborations would mean limiting U.S. progress—and understanding much less about where China stands technologically. 

Nonetheless, there are growing pressures in both countries to construct higher barriers to research exchanges. The Department of Justice’s China Initiative made many American faculty fearful of collaborating with their Chinese counterparts. China increasingly limits the exporting of data of all kinds, which, obviously, is antithetical to the practice of open science. Both countries need to take a more balanced view of the risks and benefits of working together—and sort out a renewal of the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement.

The U.S. also needs visa and immigration policies that welcome international students. Well over 100,000 Chinese graduate students study at U.S. universities each year. In 2021, the ten-year “stay rate” for Chinese students awarded doctorates in science and engineering by our universities was 81%—despite the obstacles our immigration system poses. This is a brain gain we should be celebrating. If we want to compete successfully, we need the best international talent studying and working alongside our best domestic talent.

AI is likely to underpin many of the most crucial technologies of the future for national and economic security, so it is one of the most relevant areas of competition between China and the U.S.

At MIT, we understood some years ago that AI was going to transform everything. So, we created the Schwarzman College of Computing in 2018 to strengthen MIT’s computer science core, including AI—as well as serve as a bridge between computing and all other disciplines. We consider it crucial to educate students with expertise in their discipline of choice but also fluent in AI and computing. We call them “computing bilinguals.” Developing such bilingual talent should be a nationwide effort—as should determining how to use AI to accelerate advances in science and medicine. 

The Schwarzman College is also actively working on AI policy, putting out policy briefs to help inform members of Congress and the Administration, so the U.S. can find the right balance between promoting rapid innovation and ensuring that this innovation is beneficial to society.

I strongly believe that in this global competition, ratcheting up our own strengths—including our capacity to generate transformative innovations—will be more effective than trying to hobble China.

At the same time, the two great powers cannot afford not to work together on issues that know no borders, including climate change and preventing the next pandemic. Past problems in these areas should not cause us to rule out future cooperation. We need to open a dialogue about how to do better in the future, for the benefit of humanity.

Thank you.